mercredi 30 novembre 2016

Dooyeweerd: Hume, Kant, The Unfathomable Silence of the Sphinx, Soap-bubble Reality...


THE 15 IRREDUCIBLE LAW-SPHERES 
OF OUR EXPERIENTIAL HORIZON 
Also called Aspects/ Modes/ Modalities/ Meaning-sides
(Diagrams by FMF)

NOTES (FMF):
No law-sphere (aspect) can be reduced to another. Infringements of 'irreducibility' are behind all 'isms'. These 'idolatries' show the human heart attempting to integrate entire reality around a single aspect (or 'law-sphere'). There is a plausibility to this because each aspect is present as an analogy in every other aspect (see 'Historical Aspect' diagram below). This gives each aspect an omnipresence, which Dooyeweerd designates 'sphere-universality'. 

Crucially, since no aspect can be reduced to another, none can be reduced even to the 'Logical / Analytical Aspect' (in other words, the above panoply of aspects is not a theoretical product of "logic" - it is "experiential", it is "intuitive consciousness"). This must be particularly and continually emphasised. Failure to bear that specific fact in mind makes a 'logicism' out of Dooyeweerd's philosophy, when it is primarily against logicism that he is arguing (Dooyeweerd's 'A New Critique of Theoretical Thought' is essentially a critique of Kant). A moment's reflection will observe that the aspects correspond pretty closely to standard academic disciplines.

It is key to Dooyeweerd to appreciate his insistence that there is no thinking without a thinker ("the hidden performer on the instrument of philosophic thought" (Prolegomena, New Critique). The thinker ALWAYS functions in ALL aspects, but transcends them all in the concentration-point of his or her deepest selfhood ('heart'), which is directed towards or away from the Living God Who alone gives meaning to temporal reality. In refusing God as only source of meaning, a substitute ultimate focus is sought by the selfhood within the temporal cosmos by absolutising a law-sphere (or combination of law-spheres). Hence the idol.

Dooyeweerd calls the irreducibility feature of each aspect 'sphere-sovereignty'. With reference to mutual irreducibility, Dooyeweerd draws attention to Genesis 1 where animals are created "according to their kinds"Without getting a handle on the terms 'sphere-sovereignty' and 'sphere-universality' it will be impossible to fathom Dooyeweerd's explanations on just about anything!   

Interestingly, the absolutization of any given aspect of reality invariably throws up its 'counter-idol', leading to a dualism. Something like an after-image. The counter-absolute arises as the 'Economic Aspect' of reality resists unbridled profligacy in one direction, the 'Aesthetic Aspect' resists the consequent disharmony, the 'Juridical Aspect' (eventually) avenges the destructive bias via a swing towards the counter-polarity.

Examples:
Rationalism 'deifies' the 'Logical/ Analytical Aspect'. It infringes the irreducibility of the other fourteen aspects by attempting to reduce them all to the 'Logical/ Analytical Aspect'. That is, Rationalism implies that every other aspect is a product of the absolutized 'Logical/ Analytical Aspect' (cf Kant). 

Philosophical Materialism 'deifies' the 'Physical/ Energy Aspect'. It infringes the irreducibility of the other fourteen aspects by attempting to reduce them all to 'matter', ie to the 'Physical/ Energy Aspect'. That is, Philosophical Materialism implies that every other aspect is a product of the absolutized 'Physical/ Energy Aspect'.

Combinations of the above have provoked the prevailing (humanist) 'Nature/ Freedom' dichotomy, ie that between 'Absolute Mathematical (or Natural-mechanistic) Law' and 'Absolute Personal Freedom'. The irreconcilable conflicts of this dualism are perenially revisited in movies and TV series such as the Terminator, the Matrix, Battlestar Galactica, etc. 

Postmodernism is another irrationalist (subjectivist) reaction to the 'rationalism' of reducing reality to 'One Big Story' dogmatically layed down by autonomous human thought. Many films now interrogate reality from a postmodern viewpoint, eg 'Inception', 'Sourcecode', various Tarantino movies, etc.

Christians often labour under their own 'Nature/Grace' dualisms which lead for example to a gnostic or pietistic flight from the world.

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"It is an undeniable fact that in the first life-phase of a suckling baby feeling precedes the first development of logical distinction; the latter precedes the controlling manner of forming sounds, which in turn precedes the primitive symbolical designation of concepts by words etc. But that does not prove that the higher mental functions originate from feeling as their undifferentiated origin. Rather it testifies to the truth of our view of the order of the modal aspects of experience, as a real temporal order, related to subjective duration in the genetic process." (Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought Vol II pp 112,113)
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 The above diagram focuses on the 'Historical/Culturally Formative Aspect'Besides its own irreducible (supratemporal) nucleus, its structure includes anticipatory (here in green) or retrocipatory (blue) analogical moments dynamically relating to the other fourteen aspects. The weighting of blues to greens in any given aspect depends on where that aspect appears in the fixed temporal order (compare colour sequence in a rainbow).

Thus (now considering all aspects, not just the Historical), in our everyday lives a 'feeling of claustrophobia' might be analysed as a 'Spatial' retrocipation within the 'Sensory (or Psychical) Aspect'. A 'prolix speech' as an 'Economic' anticipation within the 'Lingual Aspect'. An 'elegant stumble' would be an 'Aesthetic' anticipation within the 'Movement/Kinetic Aspect'. A 'vital clue' a 'Biotic' retrocipation within the 'Logical/Analytical Aspect'. And so on.

It should always be borne in mind that, however inadequate the above diagram, what is being referred to is the fabric of actual cosmic reality within which all aspects structurally combine, as spectrum colours combine to form clear daylight. 

Dooyeweerd sees the Divine call of civilization as a historical “opening-process”. Each succeeding aspect is "unfolded” in response to the light of God. Reactionary societies attempt to close down such burgeoning differentiation.

EVERY human ACT in thought or deed 
ALWAYS involves ALL aspects.

"Keep your heart with all diligence, 
for out of it are the issues of life." 
(Prov 4:23)
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Excerpted from: A NEW CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT
VOLUME II, CHAPTER IV

§ 1 - THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE MODAL ASPECTS WITHIN THEIR OWN SPHERES
The sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects of reality has its counterpart in the universality of each aspect within its own sphere.

The term 'sphere-universality' is intended to signify that the modal meaning-structure in each aspect gives expression to the entire coherence of meaning of all the law-spheres.

This is made possible by the retrocipations and anticipations in each meaning-modus. Immanence philosophy could not help misinterpreting this state of affairs, because of its failure to grasp this universality in relation to the modal sphere-sovereignty.

Why the different attempts at absolutizing seem to be acceptable.
The universality of each modal aspect within its own sphere may also explain the apparent success of the various absolutizations in immanence philosophy.

Hume's 'Sensory / Psychical Aspect' reductionism.
DAVID HUME, e.g., resolves the whole of given reality in impressions of feeling, or 'perceptions'. He calls out: 'Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never... can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions... This is the universe of the imagination' (A Treatise of Human Nature I, Part II, Sect. VI. Italics are mine). In this exclamation we distinctly hear his conviction that he has discovered an undeniable state of affairs.

And indeed, whatever the critical transcendental philosophy might have to say against HUME, the thesis that in 'feeling' the universe expresses itself in the whole of the cosmic meaning-coherence is irrefutable. The analysis of the meaning-structure of the law-sphere of feeling in the retrocipatory and in the anticipatory direction of time confirms the universality of this meaning-modus in every respect.

This structural analysis of the psychical modality does full justice to the kernel of truth in HUME's psychologistic conception. At the same time it lays bare the fundamental error of his psychologistic absolutization, whereas the Kantian epistemological criticism touches the root of this absolutization so little that it becomes itself guilty of absolutizing the transcendental-logical structure of thought.

The universality of the modal meaning of feeling implies that the psychical law-sphere is not self-sufficient. This universality is only possible as a modal universality of the aspect within its own sphere. Its absolutization is equal to its theoretical cancellation.

Therefore, HUME's epistemological psychologism destroys itself if it is consistently thought out. The epistemological thesis that the whole universe is given us only in psychic 'perceptions' cannot be correct. For nothing is given in theoretical abstraction.

The modal meaning of feeling itself cannot be given "an sich" (in itself), i.e. apart from the cosmic meaning-coherence in which it can function only as psychical modus.

Psychologism may try to escape from the force of this argument by answering that here we are exclusively concerned with the problem whether or not we can be aware of anything outside our impressions of feeling. But the opinion that we are at least only conscious of our psychical perceptions, is equal to the denial of any possibility of being conscious of anything. This view results in a radical kind of epistemological nihilism. Being conscious of one's impressions of feeling implies the self-consciousness of the whole of the cosmic meaning-coherence. In this coherence, feeling only exists as a modal meaning-function that lacks self-sufficiency.

Kant's 'Logical / Analytical Aspect' reductionism.
The appeal to a supposed absolute subjective pole of thought in the transcendental cogito cannot hit the heart of psychologism. In the Prolegomena we have disclosed the speculative trap in the conception of the self-sufficiency of the transcendental-logical function of thought. At bottom this self-sufficiency is open to the same criticism as the psychologistic view. A genuinely transcendental epistemological criticism necessarily reveals the self-insufficiency of the transcendental-logical function of thinking, both in theoretical self-reflection and with regard to the temporal intermodal coherence between the experiential aspects. This coherence only makes transcendental logical thought possible. [Or perhaps better: 'Only this coherence makes transcendental logical thought possible.' ?? FMF]

The really radical criticism of the conception of the "Unbedingtheit" (absoluteness, unlimitedness, being unconditioned) of transcendental logical thought is the analysis of the structure of its universality of meaning within its own sphere. Such an analysis also explains the seeming plausibility of the transcendental-logicistic conception. But more about this later on.

In the same way we can show the fundamental error of historicism, aestheticism, mathematicism, biologism, etc., viz. by a structural analysis of the universality of each of the law-spheres absolutized by them.

The Divine irony in the history of apostate philosophy.
The universality of each of the law-spheres within its own boundaries can only be seen in its true structure from the Christian transcendence-standpoint.

Immanence-philosophy continually goes astray, because in its Archimedean point lurks a primary absolutization of meaning.This absolutization is due to a misinterpretation of the universality of each law-sphere within its own limits. There is a Divine irony in the development of apostate philosophy, since the temporal world-order at first seems to justify every kind of theoretical absolutization in an equal measure. When viewed from the immanence-standpoint, is not historicism as convincing as a logicistic or a psychologistical interpretation of empirical reality? Is not it an indisputable fact that in theoretical thought as well as in the life of human feeling is revealed the prevailing tendency of a special period of history? Is it not true that HUME's psychologism as well as KANT's transcendental philosophy bear the stamp of modern western culture? 

HUME asserts that the universe is given to us only in psychical impressions. Wherever we direct our gaze we are supposed to find nothing but 'perceptions'. But cannot this music be transposed with equal justice into the key of the historical aspect? 

HUME thinks he can start from some permanent uniformity of human nature. He places his epistemology outside the current of historical development. Is this not a false dogmatism when confronted with the indisputable universality of the course of historical development?

Indeed, historicism cannot be dethroned solely with formally-logical arguments, no more than transcendental psychologism will capitulate to a logicistical transcendental philosophy.

Only the insight into the universality of the historical aspect within its own sphere reveals the fundamental error of historicism and the grounds for its seeming plausibility.

The cosmic order passes an internal judgment on the theoretical absolutizations of immanence-philosophy, which invariably result in internal antinomies. We cannot interpret the Divine order on the basis of a self-sufficient and autonomous reason. Apart from the Divine Word-revelation, this order maintains the unfathomable silence of the Sphinx.

So long as pistis (faith) remains closed to this Word-revelation, theoretical thought remains under the ban of mythology. The Divine world-order begins to appeal to us only when our heart and our function of faith are open to the voice of God's Word. Then we become aware of the religious foundation of that wonderful universality of each of the modal aspects. For only in the disclosed insight into this profound state of affairs does the Christian see the true connection between temporal reality and the Christian religion in the theoretical cognitive attitude. In the pre-theoretic attitude of thought s/he ought to experience this relation immediately in faith apart from any theory. 

Anyone who, as a Christian thinker, has seen through the modal sphere-universality, cannot fall back into the nominalistic dualism between believing and thinking, and between 'nature' and 'grace'. Every dualism of this kind makes the temporal modal functions self-sufficient with regard to their religious root. But there is nothing in time that can be set apart and by itself.

The Idea of the universality of each aspect within its own sphere should be related to the process of disclosure in the temporal cosmic meaning-coherence in order to reveal its full import.

The new problem: The intermodal disharmony in the opening-process.
But at this very point Christian philosophy is once again confronted with the problem concerning the influence of sin on this process. If it were permissible for a Christian to choose a purely eschatological standpoint with regard to our sinful cosmos, the Idea of universal meaning-disclosure would no longer hide any internal tensions and antitheses.

The Idea of the fulfilment of meaning in Christ undoubtedly implies that in the specific universality of each law-sphere the opening-process gives temporal expression to the full religious abundance of God's creation both on its law- and its subject-side.

In this world, however, this sphere-universality cannot unfold itself perfectly in accordance with the guidance of the religious fulness of meaning. The development is affected by sin, otherwise the refraction of the fulness of meaning in time would no-where be experienced as disharmony. If there were no sin, the harmony among the law-spheres would be fully realized, just as in a perfect work of art. In such a work the 'natural' sides of the material are subjected to the guidance of the aesthetic structural function to such a degree that they no longer obtrude themselves as a disconcerting resistance. In their individual deepening of meaning and 'spiritualization', they are a pure expression of the artist's conception. Reality is, alas, different. The deification of the temporal meaning-aspects of the cosmos in apostate faith, expanded to free striving leadership, causes a fundamental disharmony in the opening-process.

In the previous chapter this disharmony was only considered in its modal historical sense. But we have now to examine it in the intermodal coherence of the different aspects of the process of meaning-disclosure.

If apostate faith gains the functional guidance in the opening-process, the subjection of the latter to the Divine world-order is not thereby cancelled. The Creator of Heaven and Earth maintains the functional-structural law-conformity in the disclosure of the temporal modal aspects against any human arbitrariness. If the Divine order in the temporal cosmos were not kept intact and elevated above any kind of human hubris, the manifestation of sin in time would not even be possible. For the whole of temporal reality would then burst like a soap-bubble.

Does this mean that the effect of sin leaves the law-side of the creation entirely unaffected, and can only manifest itself on the side of the subject?

But such a view would be at variance with the structure of the cosmic order analysed in an earlier part of this work. For in all the normative law-spheres the nómos (law)  has been laid down only in the form of a  principle. These Divine 'principia' have been left to human formation and positivizing in accordance with the modal structure of the law-spheres.

In the opening-process of the normative anticipatory spheres even the laws of the pre-logical aspects require this human intervention for their deepening of meaning. From the point of view of the structure of the temporal cosmos we can state that the disharmony in consequence of sin must necessarily also manifest itself on the law-side in the work of human formation and positivizing.

In this human interference the Divine structural principles are doubtless maintained and saved from human arbitrariness. Even the most impious law-maker or former of history can only form law or culture by the formation and positivizing of super-arbitrary principles founded in the order of creation (These principles are to be sharply distinguished from the subjective principles of political parties).

The formal abolishing of paternal authority by the first wave of the French Revolution was one of the many 'paper decrees' which, as an expression of human hubris, were swept away by what is very inadequately termed the logic of the facts. By setting aside the normative principles of law, morality, or culture, human arbitrariness can create a social chaos; it cannot create juridical, moral or historical norms in this way.

The human work of formation remains unshakably bound to the Divine structural principles of the normative law-spheres. But in this very work of formation and positivization the process of opening of the temporal meaning on the law-side cannot be carried out harmoniously, when in apostasy it has lost its direction to the religious fulness of meaning. Disharmony on the law-side is then inevitable, because the opening-process invariably moves in the direction of the absolutizing of certain meaning-moments.

It would be an illusion to think that this disharmony would not appear if the work of formation and positivization were only in the hands of Christians. For on the one hand, a Christian remains a thoroughly sinful creature, no better in himself than others. And on the other hand, the Christian former is bound to the history of mankind as a whole. In keeping with the entire structure of the Divine world-order, he cannot escape his historical position in a society in which the power of the civitas terrena ['Godless city' FMF] is clearly revealed.

Within the opening-process of temporal meaning the position of genuine Christianity is one of restless struggle. In its temporary defeats and victories Christianity bears witness to the sinful broken state of its existence and that of the entire earthly creation; its position is only justified through faith in Christ. In Him the struggle for historical power in the opening-process may become a temporal blessing for a corrupted and broken world. The Christian Idea of the opening-process, guided by the faith in Christ as the Redeemer, cannot detach itself from sinful reality in an idealistic optimism. This Idea would then become false and worthless to temporal life. It must rather remain broken in character, in spite of its direction to the Root of reborn humanity, to Christ Jesus and to the Sovereign Creator, Who is willing to be our Father in Him. 

Only in its eschatological expectation of the ultimate full revelation of the Kingdom of God can Christian belief rise above this broken state without losing its relation to the sinful cosmos. For the same reason the Idea of the universality of each of the aspects within its own sphere cannot be conceived in a purely eschatological sense; it should also be related to our sinful cosmos.

This Idea retains its normative transcendental direction to the consummation of meaning in Christ. But at the same time it should give us an insight into the disharmony that the process of disclosure shows in apostasy. Only in this way can we arrive at a satisfying conception of the Christian Idea of cultural development.

Attention should first be directed to the disharmony in the opening of meaning on the law-side of the normative aspects due to apostate faith. This theme can only be treated in an exemplifying way. Our examination will restrict itself to an analysis of the influence of faith in the mathematical Humanistic science-ideal upon the opening-process in the different spheres. It stands to reason that this influence could not fail primarily to reveal itself in the domain of science.
[----]
§ 4 - FINAL REMARKS ON THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT.
To Humanistic philosophic thought the disharmony, manifesting itself even on the law-side of the opening-process in the sinful cosmos, changes into antinomy. This is the original antinomy in the two basic factors of the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea: the ideal of science and that of personality.

For the Christian philosophic consciousness, however, conforming to the fundamental structure of the Christian cosmonomic Idea, without compromising with immanence-philosophy, it is impossible to accept antinomies in the Divine world order, even in this sinful world.

The disharmony referred to manifests itself only as a defect in the opening-process under the curse of sin. For a Christian there can be no question of the inner antinomy that Humanism has to experience on seeing how human personality, claiming to be autonomous in its self-sufficient freedom, is being enslaved by its own rational creations. The Divine world-order is not itself antinomic when it avenges itself on every deification of temporal meaning by the disharmony caused on account of this apostasy in the opening process. No more is it antinomic when it causes philosophical thought to entangle itself in inner antinomies, as soon as this thought supposes it can ignore the Divine order.

This world-order binds the normative process of disclosure, in the foundational direction of time, to the historical formation of power. In the transcendental direction it binds the opening-process to the direction of faith, and at the same time the world-order points beyond and above all the temporal law-spheres to the religious radical unity of the Divine law. That is why truly Christian philosophic thought cannot discover any antinomy nor any paradox in the validity within a sinful world of the full religious demand of the Divine law. This law even remains in force in a world in which the temporal ordinances of the law-spheres through sinful human formation have been drawn away from their direction to the fulness of meaning of the Divine law. 

Holy and without any inner contradiction is the world-order, even when it binds the possibility of a defective positivizing of Christian principles to a historical basis of power and to the guidance of true Christian faith.

Holy and without inner contradiction is the world-order, when it avenges itself on the process of disclosure in which the civitas terrena ['Godless city' FMF] has gained the power to direct the formation of history.

The defectiveness caused by sin in the root and the temporal refraction of meaning, has been expressed in our transcendental basic Idea itself in the struggle between the civitas Dei ['Godly city' FMF] and the civitas terrena ['Godless city' FMF]. It must therefore also naturally find its expression in our Idea of historical development, in our economic Idea, in our Idea of justice, of morals, of beauty, etc.

The Christian Idea of cultural development cannot be guided by an optimistic faith in the steady progress of civilization. It cannot be sacrificed to pessimistic relativistic Historicism either. It remains ruled by the religious basic motive of the struggle between the civitas Dei ['Godly city' FMF] and the civitas terrena ['Godless city' FMF] in the temporal course of history, though eschatologically it remains directed to the ultimate victory of the Kingdom of God in Christ, to Whom has been given the fulness of power in the religious fulfilment of history.

The methodical application of the Christian Idea of cultural development in historical science.
The functional structure of the opening-process, in connection with the modal universality of the aspects, each in its own sphere, provides us with the insight into the only possible method of using this Idea of development in historical investigations.

Our analysis has yielded a univocal criterion to distinguish between primitive and disclosed cultural spheres, which criterion is a necessary hypothesis for historical science proper. We saw further that a real opening of the historical aspect is possible under the guidance of an apostate faith, and that in this case the process of disclosure must show its disharmonious character also on the law-side of the aspects. We have frankly to acknowledge that apostate movements have their special task in history when they have gained the power to form and to positivize deepened cultural principles of development. 

But this entire view of history implies a radical rejection of Historicism. We have explained (cf. our analysis of the universality of the aspect of history in its own sphere) that any true meaning-disclosure of history points beyond and above this aspect and is only possible in the universal temporal meaning-coherence of all the modal law-spheres.

The Christian Idea of development, therefore, cannot be narrow-minded. It recognizes any relative meaning-disclosure of civilization, even though positivized by anti-Christian powers. Every spiritual movement, having the power of historical formation has to fulfil its own task as an instrument in the hand of God. Our developmental Idea has broken with any speculative philosophical or theological construction of periods in cultural development. And above all, it continues to observe the inner tension between sinful reality and  the full demand of the Divine law.

This demand is terrifying when we consider how much the temporal ordinances labour under the destructive power of the fall into sin. Terrifying also, when it puts before us our task as Christians in the struggle for the power of cultural formation.

For it makes a demand on us which as sinful human beings we cannot satisfy in any way. And it urges us, in the misery of our hearts, to seek refuge with Christ, from Whose fulness, nevertheless, a Christian can derive the confidence of faith to carry on the ceaseless struggle for the control of cultural development. This is the remarkable 'nevertheless' of Christian faith.

Christian philosophic thought has to fight shy of self-exaltation, because it is directed in its root to Christ. The whole struggle that positive Christianity has to carry on for the direction of the opening process is not directed against our fellow humans, in whose sin we partake and whose guilt is ours and whom we should love as our neighbours. That struggle is directed against the spirit of darkness who dragged us all down with him in the apostasy from God, and who can only be resisted in the power of Christ.

As Christians we shall hate that spirit because of the love of God's creation in Christ Jesus.

(Herman Dooyeweerd: 'A New Critique of Theoretical Thought', Vol II, pp 331-337, 362-365)

Full text of above book can be freely read online, or downloaded as pdfs HERE.

A recent four-volume hardback facsimile reprint is also available (Paideia Press).
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samedi 19 novembre 2016

Dooyeweerd: Philosophy: Preliminary Questions


"Genuine philosophical thinking is not possible without an implicit or explicit answer to a set of preliminary questions:

1. In the first place, what is the relation between theoretical thinking and the full self that is actually doing the thinking?

2. Secondly, how are both of these (i.e. the self and the thinking of the self) related to the temporal cosmos?

3. And thirdly, in which origin, or archè, does thinking come to rest in the sense that there is no theoretical questioning beyond that origin?


This is no arbitrary description of philosophy´s preliminary questions. Rather, it is bound up with the genuine nature of philosophical thinking as such. Anyone who seeks to account for this nature necessarily encounters these preliminary questions. They are given an answer, implicitly or explicitly, in the philosophical ground-idea, by which philosophy is directed from beginning to end. Together these answers form the totality of the necessary presuppositions of every philosophy."

Excerpted from "The Dilemma for Christian Philosophical Thought & the Critical Character of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea (Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee)" by Herman Dooyeweerd (Translated by Chris van Haeften) [SEE HERE]


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A Musing Regarding our Archimedean Point

The Archimedean point is NOT theoretical but is the central concentration point within our full supratemporal selfhood of the diversity of temporal aspects (law-spheres). It necessarily therefore transcends the temporal aspects of which it is the focus (cf Andree Troost's "Melchizidek" reference in 'What is Reformational Philosophy'). 

Our Archimedean point itself finds anchorage in the Living God to Whom "we draw near with a sincere HEART" as ultimate ground and source of meaning, "firm and secure within the veil". Idolatry represents a doomed rebellious attempt to find anchorage and ultimate personal and cosmic integration somewhere within abstract theory or within time. (Fearghas MacFhionnlaigh)

Dooyeweerd writes:

"It follows that true self-knowledge is the primary condition for truly critical philosophical reflection. For where the self seeks its reliable ground and origin, that is where the Archimedean point of its philosophy is. Once we have understood this state of affairs, we can only conclude that the idea of the immanent self-sufficiency of theoretical thought betrays a lack of veritable critical self-reflection. The choice of the Archimedean point cannot be purely theoretical, for it is only the thinker himself who is able to make this choice. Rather than theoretical this choice is a religious act. In this act theoretical thought is concentrated upon that which is accepted by the thinking self as the ultimate root and self-sufficient origin of the cosmos. 

This self, which in Holy Scripture is called the heart, from which life springs, is subject to the restless search for its own origin and that of the entire cosmos. This is the religious law of concentration, which even on the immanence–standpoint does not lose its sway. This unrest, issuing from man’s heart, affects philosophical thought, which in its tendency towards origin and totality cannot but point beyond its own immanent limits towards its ultimate religious Root and its Origin

The philosophical ground-idea is the foundation of all philosophy. It is the ultimate theoretical limiting idea in which this tendency towards origin and totality comes to expression. When we reflect upon it, we get to the necessary presuppositions of all philosophical thought. 

By the light of God´s revelation in Jesus Christ we do not regard the immanence standpoint as a natural premise for the Christian transcendence standpoint, but rather as a radical defection (apostasy) from the genuine self and from the true origin of all things. Thus we regard it as a falling away from the reliable ground and Origin of truth. The self that seeks a reliable ground in its theoretical thinking has fallen away from its true nature. In the end it identifies itself with its thought-abstraction. By so doing, it stumbles into the temporal diversity of meaning, where it is being dispersed. It can then only find its concentration in an absolutization, that is to say, a deification of something created."

Excerpted from "The Dilemma for Christian Philosophical Thought & the Critical Character of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea (Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee)" by Herman Dooyeweerd (Translated by Chris van Haeften) [SEE HERE]

Dooyeweerd: Introduction to a Transcendental Criticism of Philosophic Thought

INTRODUCTION TO A TRANSCENDENTAL CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT
by Herman Dooyeweerd (1947)

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NOTE: This lecture, published in Jan 1947 in the Evangelical Quarterly XIX (1), was originally delivered to French students in Amsterdam. "The Philosophy of the Idea of Law" received its name from Professor Dooyeweerd's large Dutch work bearing that title ("De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee") which appeared in three volumes published by Panis at Amsterdam, 1935-6. The publication of this work occasioned the founding of the Union for Calvinist Philosophy. Dooyeweerd eventually sought to have the term 'Calvinist' changed, as too limiting in resonance.)
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THE subject which I have chosen for my lecture gives me the opportunity of informing you of some of the fundamental characteristics of the new philosophy which has been developed during the last twenty years at the Free University of Amsterdam, and which has come to be known as "The Philosophy of the Idea of Law".

What is the meaning of this Philosophy?

It is a fact generally known that the student who sets himself to study the history of Philosophy finds himself much embarrassed and even disappointed because he must observe profound disagreement between the different schools even with regard to the most fundamental principles of philosophy. In this situation the most embarrassing point is that the different schools, so far at least as they maintain the scientific character of philosophy, profess all alike to be founded solely on purely theoretical and scientific principles; in other words, that they are all adherents of the so-called autonomy of reason. Now if that were true it seems a little astonishing that they cannot succeed in convincing one another by purely scientific arguments. When for example a philosopher of the Thomist school alleges that he can prove by purely scientific arguments the existence of a supreme God, First Cause and Final End of the universe, and the existence of a rational immortal soul, a substance immaterial, indissoluble and simple, he meets a philosopher of the Kantian "critical" school who alleges on the contrary that all these arguments issue from a vain and sterile metaphysic, based on the misuse of the categories of the understanding and the theoretical ideas of pure reason. The Thomist for his part does not believe his position to be affected by the "critical" arguments. The result is that these schools continue to follow each its own way after a simulated combat. Have they had real intellectual contact? I believe the answer must be: No.

That prompts us to raise the question whether theoretical principles are the true starting point of these schools. Would it not be possible that their true starting point is hidden beneath supposedly scientific theses, and that scientific thought has deeper roots which must be discovered in order to establish contact between different schools of philosophic thought? The Philosophy of the Idea of Law has raised that question, which is closely related to the question of the relation between faith and scientific thought.

It begins with a criticism, thus called transcendental, of philosophic thought, and demands a profound study of its universal and necessary structure. It opens this criticism by raising the problem: how is a scientific philosophy possible? that is to say under what universal and necessary conditions?

At first sight it might appear that this problem is not at all new. Did not Kant, the founder of the "critical" school, already ask: How is an objective experience, i.e. a truly scientific experience, possible? But this latter problem is not identical with that raised by the Philosophy of the Idea of Law. Kant wanted to investigate only the objective basis of the mathematical sciences and the Newtonian Physics, and the true limits of scientific thought with regard to metaphysics. But he did not examine the possibility of a critical theory of human knowledge as a purely scientific theory.

He invites his readers in the introduction to his celebrated work, The Critique of Pure Reason, to accept no other datum than Pure Reason. Consequently the theoretical attitude of thought has for him nothing problematical. He considers it as an unshakable datum. Now it is precisely here that the Philosophy of the Idea of Law sets its mark of interrogation. It demands a truly critical study of the structure of theoretical thought as such.

(1) By what characteristics is scientific thought distinguished from pre-scientific thought and common experience? 

Without doubt it is characterised by a specific attitude in which we create a theoretic distance between the logical aspect [or 'analytical law-sphere' - see above chart] of our thought and the non-logical aspect of our field of study. This attitude produces an antithetical relation in which the logical aspect of our thought is opposed to the non-logical aspect of the reality investigated. In this antithetic relation the nonlogical aspect opposes a resistance to every effort of our understanding to comprehend it in a logical concept. From this theoretic antithesis arises the scientific problem. The Germans have expressed this resistance of the object of knowledge by the strong word Gegenstand.

Does this antithetic relation correspond to reality? Not at all. If it were true there would be in effect a deep gulf fixed between the logical aspect of our thought and the non-logical aspect which is its Gegenstand, its opposite. There would be no possibility of throwing a bridge across this abyss. The possibility of knowledge would be lost. In fact the antithetic relation is based upon a purely theoretic abstraction. The different aspects of reality are indissolubly linked by time, which is the deepest ground of temporal reality. This allows us to raise a second problem which we may formulate thus:

(2) From what is abstraction made in scientific thought and how is this abstraction possible?

In setting this problem we may not start from the antithetic relation as from a datum involving no problem in itself. It is far from being a datum, for it contains precisely a fundamental problem. Let us now compare the theoretic attitude with the pre-theoretic attitude of common experience. The latter is characterised by an absolute lack of all antithetic relation. In the attitude of common experience we find ourselves completely within empirical reality with all the functions of our consciousness. There is no distance, no opposition between the logical aspect of our thought and the non-logical aspects of reality. But if there is an absolute lack of the antithetic relation, naïve experience is none the less characterised by another relation, namely the relation of the subject to the object of our experience. Current philosophy has very erroneously confounded this relation with the antithetic relation of theoretical thought. It is precisely the opposite.

In naïve experience we attribute without hesitation objective qualities – sensual, logical, cultural, social, aesthetic, even moral – to the objects of our common life. We know very well that they cannot function as subjects which feel, distinguish logically, live together in a society, or make value-judgments. We know perfectly that these objective qualities belong to them only with reference to the subjective functions of some possible consciousness.

We experience this relation of subject and object as a structural relation of reality itself. That is to say, sensual colour belongs to the rose only with reference to a possible sensual perception, not to my individual perception or yours. To sum up: the subject-object relation leaves reality intact, together. The antithetic relation on the contrary is the product of an analysis, an abstraction.

The view of naïve experience which I have here given you is not generally accepted. Current opinion considers naïve experience from the theoretical point of view. It is conceived as specific theory of reality, the so-called "naïve realist" theory, or the "image theory". According to this view, naïve experience would imagine that human consciousness was placed like a photographic apparatus opposite a reality, as it were, independent of that consciousness. This " reality in itself " would be reproduced faithfully and completely in consciousness. That is a very erroneous conception of naïve experience. Naïve experience is not a theory of reality. Rather it takes reality as it is given. It is itself a datum, or rather the supreme datum for every theory of reality and of knowledge.

Let us return now to the antithetic relation of scientific thought. We have seen that from this relation arises the scientific problem. Theoretical thought cannot stop before the problem. It must advance from theoretical antithesis to synthesis. It must arrive at a logical concept of the non-logical aspect of reality. Here emerges a new problem, which we may formulate thus:

(3) From what starting point is it possible to apprehend integrally in a synthetic view the diverse aspects of reality which are analysed and opposed to one another in the antithetic relation?

In raising this problem the Philosophy of the Idea of Law submits every possible starting point of philosophic thought to a fundamental criticism.

Now it is indubitable that a truly critical attitude of thought does not permit us to choose the starting point in one of the opposed terms of the antithetic relation, that is, neither in the logical aspect of our thought, nor in the non-logical aspect of the object of our thought. Yet the current philosophy seems obliged by its dogma of the autonomy of reason to seek a point of departure in theoretical thought itself. Now here arises an inescapable embarrassment. For by its intrinsic structure the logical aspect of our thought in its scientific function is obliged to proceed by a theoretical synthesis. And there are as many possible theoretical syntheses as reality has aspects. There is a synthesis of a mathematical nature, another of a physical nature, another biological, psychological, historical, sociological, etc., etc. In which of these possible syntheses will philosophical thought seek its point of departure? It matters not which it chooses, for it will always exaggerate one of these aspects, and this will lead to the proclamation of the absolutism of one of the special synthetic points of view. There is the true source of all the "isms" in philosophy, which haunt scientific thought and furiously give one another battle.

Now it is curious that apparently all these "isms" can be pursued in theory. How is that possible? The Philosophy of the Idea of Law has unveiled this mystery by a serious analysis of the structure of the aspects of reality.

What is a structure? It is an architectonic plan according to which a diversity of "moments" is united in a totality. And that is only possible so long as the different "moments" do not occupy the same place in the totality but are rather knit together by a directive and central "moment". This is precisely the situation with regard to the structure of the different aspects of reality. They have an enduring structure in time which is the necessary condition for the functioning of variable phenomena in the framework of these aspects.

In this structure we find, necessarily, a central and directive “moment” which cannot be logically defined because by it an aspect maintains its individuality with regard to all the other aspects of reality, even with regard to the logical aspect of our thought. We call this directive "moment" the "nuclear moment". The "nuclear moment”, however, cannot display its individuality except in close liaison with a series of other “moments”. These latter are by nature partially analogical, i.e. they recall the "nuclear moments" of all the aspects which have an anterior place in the order of aspects. Partially also they are of the nature of anticipations, which recall the "nuclear moments" of all the aspects which have a later place in that order.

Let us take for example the sensation-aspect of reality. In its structure we find a nuclear element which cannot be further reduced and which guarantees the individuality of the aspect in its proper sense. This is the "sensation-moment as such". "Was man nicht definieren kann, das sieht man als ein Fuehlen an" . Only it would be quite wrong to suppose that this is a trait characteristic of the sensation-aspect of reality and of it alone. In fact we encounter the same situation in all the other aspects.

Round this central or nuclear "moment" are grouped analogical "moments". We find in the first place an analogical “moment" which recalls the nuclear "moment" of the biological aspect of reality. There is a living sensation and in this "vital moment" the sensation-aspect discovers its indissoluble liaison with the aspect of organic life. The living sensation is not identical with the organic life of our body. It obeys its own laws, which are of a psychological nature. It remains characterised by its own nuclear "moment” the "sensation moment". Nevertheless there is no living sensation possible without the solid foundation of an organic life in the biological sense.

Then in the structure of the sensation-aspect we find an analogical "moment" which recalls the nuclear moment of the physical aspect, i.e., movement. No sensation-life is possible which does not reveal itself in emotions. Emotion is a movement of feeling. But a movement of feeling cannot be reduced to a physical or chemical movement. It remains characterised by its nuclear " moment " and submissive to its own psychological laws. Only, every emotion takes place on the solid foundation of the physical and chemical movements of our body.

Next we find in the structure of the sensation aspect an analogical " moment " which recalls the nuclear moment of the spatial aspect of reality. In the life of sensation there is necessarily a feeling of space which corresponds to perceived space, and is differentiated as optical, auditive and tactile space. This perceived space is not at all identical with mathematical space but it is not possible without the foundation of the latter.

Finally, we find in the structure of the sensation-aspect an analogical " moment " which recalls the nuclear moment of the arithmetical aspect, i.e., quantity or number. There is no emotional life possible without a multiplicity and diversity of sensations. This multiplicity is not at all identical with multiplicity in the arithmetical sense. It is qualitative and psychological. It allows no quantitative isolation like the different parts of a straight line. The different sensations penetrate one another. Only, this multiplicity is impossible without the foundation of an arithmetical multiplicity.

So far we have analysed the structure of the sensation-aspect only in the analogical direction. That is the "primitive or closed situation" in which we find the sensation-life in the animals. But when you study the sensation-life of man you discover “moments” of anticipation by which the life of feeling relates itself to the nuclear " moments " of all the later aspects of reality. We meet successively a logical feeling, an historical feeling, a linguistic feeling, a social feeling for propriety and tact, an economic feeling, an aesthetic feeling, a feeling for right, a moral feeling and a feeling of unshakable certitude which is akin to faith.

Here is revealed a structural phenomenon which we call the universality in its proper orbit of every aspect of reality. Every aspect is a true mirror of the entire order of aspects. It reflects in its own way the totality of aspects. And here at the same time is the clue to all the philosophical "isms". We now understand how it is possible for them all to be pursued equally with the appearance of conviction. And it is also evident that they cannot result from a truly critical attitude of thought. For we must choose between these alternatives: either all the "isms" are equally right, in which case they destroy one another: or they are equally wrong, and that is more likely. Thus it appears that the current opinion which maintains the autonomy of scientific thought is self-refuted.

It is just at this point that Immanuel Kant, the founder of the "critical" school, believed he could show another way. He saw very clearly that the various philosophical "isms" lack a critical attitude. He seeks a starting point for his theoretical philosophy which would be raised above the special synthetic points of view. And he is of opinion that this transcendent point of our consciousness can only be discovered by the way of knowledge of ourselves. This way contains a great promise. For it is indubitable that our theoretical thought, so long as it is fixed on the different aspects of reality, is dissipated in a theoretical diversity. Only in the way of knowledge of itself can human consciousness concentrate on a central point where all the aspects of our consciousness converge in a radical unity. The ancient Greek philosophers knew this very well. Socrates already laid it down that self-knowledge is the key to all philosophy. But here arises a new problem, which we may formulate thus:

(4) How is self-knowledge possible, and of what nature is this knowledge?

Kant did not wish to abandon the theoretical point of departure. Owing to the dogma of the autonomy of scientific thought he is obliged to seek a starting point in pure reason itself. But he supposes it will be possible to demonstrate in scientific thought itself a transcendent point of consciousness which will be raised above the different special synthetic viewpoints. This is how he thinks to resolve the problem. He believes that in the logical aspect of our thought there is a subjective pole – “I think” – which has an opposite pole in every concrete empirical reality, and which guarantees the radical unity of all our synthetic acts. This "I think" is, according to him, the ultimate logical subject, which can never become the object of our knowledge, because every act of theoretical knowing must start from "I think". This "I think" is not at all identical with our concrete acts of thinking. These latter can themselves become the object of "I think"; while "I think" is the universal and necessary condition of every theoretic and synthetic act of our consciousness. It has no individuality. It is not of an empirical nature. It is a condition, logical and general by nature, of every scientific act.

The question now is whether Kant has succeeded in demonstrating a true point of departure in theoretical thought~ and the answer must be: No. As we have just seen, the point of departure of theoretical thought must transcend the opposed terms of the antithetic relation. But Kant seeks for one in the logical aspect of thought. "I think" remains within the antithetic relation, opposed to the object. In the logical aspect there cannot be a radical unity given in "I think". For we have seen that the structure of a specific aspect is always a unity in diversity of "moments" and never a unity above the "moments". Besides it is a profound error to suppose that empirical reality itself could become the object of the logical aspect of our thought. The object is always the product of a theoretical abstraction by which a non-logical aspect of reality is opposed to the logical aspect of our thought.

Thus there arises anew the problem which we have already formulated. How is self-knowledge possible? For indubitably the way of self-knowledge will be the sole way to discover the true starting point of our scientific thought. Now it is generally admitted that self-knowledge is always correlative to knowledge of God. When for example Aristotle seeks the characteristic and central point of human nature in the theoretical understanding, this self-knowledge is indissolubly knit with his conception of God. God is for Aristotle Absolute Theoretical Thought, noesis noeseos which has only itself for object, and which is pure form opposed to all matter. When in modern philosophy the great German thinker Leibniz seeks the central point of human nature in mathematical thought with its clear and distinct concepts, this self-knowledge is quite dependent on his conception of God. God is for Leibiniz the archetypal Intellect, the great Geometrician, Creative Thought. And when Kant, in his Critique of Practical Reason, seeks the true core of human nature in its moral function, in its liberty to give itself its own laws, this self-knowledge is correlative to his idea of God, which is moralistic.

In fact self-knowledge is by nature religious. Man's "Self" is the concentration point of all his existence, of all his functions within the different aspects of temporal reality. The Self is the religious centre, the heart, as Holy Scripture says, of all existence. The Self seeks, by an original innate tendency, its divine origin, and cannot know itself except in this original relation.

The true starting point of any possible philosophy is always a fundamentally religious motive. That is guaranteed by the very structure of theoretical thought which we have investigated above. These religious motives are the true motive forces which have dominated the evolution of western scientific thought. Each motive establishes a community among those who start from it. It dominates the thinker all the more if he is unconscious of his hidden religious motive.

There have been four great religious motives which have dominated the evolution of western scientific thought. I can but briefly mention them.

In the first place there is the great motive of Matter and Form, which was the fundamental motive of Greek thought. It originates in an endless conflict in the religious consciousness of the Greeks between the natural religion of antiquity and the cultural religion of the Olympic gods. Matter corresponds to the faith of the ancient natural religion, according to which divinity was the great vital current without stable or personal form, out of which emerge all beings of individual form, which are subject to the great law of birth and death by a blind necessity, Anangke. The motive of Form corresponds to the faith of the later religion of the Olympic gods who are only deified cultural forces who have left their mother earth with its vital current to receive an immortal, personal and invisible form. But the Olympic gods have no power over against. Anangke, which dominates the stream of life and death. Anangke is their great antagonist.

The second fundamental motive was introduced into western thought by the Christian religion. It is the motive of the Creation, the radical Fall due to sin, and Redemption in Jesus Christ. The third is that of Nature and Grace, introduced by Catholicism, which originates in an attempt to reconcile the opposed religious motives of Greek and Christian thought. The fourth is that of Nature and Liberty [or "Freedom"], introduced by modern Humanism, which originates in an insoluble conflict between the religious cult of human personality in its liberty and autonomy and the desire to dominate reality by modern natural science, which seeks to construe it as a rational and uninterrupted chain of causes and effects. This humanist motive has absorbed into itself the three earlier fundamental motives, secularising the Christian motive and the Catholic motive.

It is evident that a critical study of the influence of these great religious motives on scientific thought should open the door to a profounder view of the history of philosophy. Here in fact are to be discovered the profound roots of scientific thought which were hidden by theoretical masks under the reign of the dogma of the autonomy of reason. Here also appears the only way to establish real contact or discussion between the different schools, which at present seems impossible for lack of any notion of the true starting points of philosophy.

I regret that I cannot now pursue this transcendental criticism of philosophic thought in its application to the different schools. I hope however that I have succeeded in inspiring in you some interest in the critical view of the Philosophy of the Idea of Law.

H. DOOYEWEERD.
Free University of Amsterdam (1947)