samedi 16 septembre 2023

Herman Dooyeweerd: Critique of Logos Theory 7. Kuyper, Woltjer, and Bavinck logicized God’s order for the creation

7. Kuyper, Woltjer, and Bavinck logicized God’s order for the creation

 (Extract from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II)


The Reformed thinkers Kuyper, Woltjer, and Bavinck, contrary to their starting point, indeed logicized God’s order for the creation. What brought them to this was the “ideal-realistic” twist that they gave to the Kantian critique of knowledge. Taking a stand against Kant’s notion that all law-governed relations are subjective and transcendental-logical in origin and nature, they enlisted the services of the traditional scholastic theory of the logos in order to escape Kant’s subjectivism. 


In so doing, however, they failed to attack Kant’s critique at its root. They made no change in Kant’s view that all law-governed relations without exception are logical. Instead, they located the origin of these relations not in the human, but in the divine Logos, the divine Reason with its unity of “logical thought” and “word” that had already been spoken of by Philo


Thus they viewed the relationships in knowing things not as subjectively logical, but as objectively logical; and they thought that this logical nature was what allowed them to be grasped by our logical thought. For these thinkers maintained that in the process of gaining theoretical knowledge, as Aristotle had taught, a union takes place between the subjective logical function of thought and the objective logical ontic forms of knowable things.


To some extent one can appreciate this attempt to evade Kantian subjectivistic epistemology by appealing to a rational divine plan of creation. Nevertheless, one cannot fail to notice that this entire logicistic view of the divine creation ordinances conflicts flagrantly with Kuyper’s religious understanding of God’s law, in which he put his finger on the very heart of the Reformed position. This religious understanding, which is worked out particularly in Kuyper’s Stone Lectures on Calvinism, accepted Augustine’s and Calvin’s starting point in the absolute sovereignty of God’s will as Creator. God stands above the laws He has imposed on His creation. Nevertheless, these laws are not a product of arbitrary despotism; for they are in complete harmony with God’s holy nature.


It was precisely Kuyper, in fact, who took the first step toward making this religious understanding of the law fruitful for Christian philosophical thought. In the second Stone Lecture, which deals with “Calvinism and Religion,” Kuyper’s confession of God’s sovereignty as Creator is immediately worked out in his theory of the distinct spheres of laws or ordinances:

“Everything that has been created” [Kuyper writes] “was, in its creation, furnished by God with an unchangeable law of its existence. And because God has fully ordained such laws and ordinances for all life, therefore the Calvinist demands that all life be consecrated to His service, in strict obedience. A religion confined to the closet, the cell, or the church, therefore, Calvin abhors.” (second Stone Lecture: “Calvinism and Religion”).

These words of Kuyper completely rule out the metaphysical theory of the logos. They express an understanding of God’s law for His creation that is purely religious and Scriptural. Note how Kuyper developed this thought further:

“What now does the Calvinist mean by his faith in the ordinances of God? Nothing less than the conviction firmly rooted in man’s heart [Dooyeweerd inserts: nota bene, not in his “reason.”] that all life has first been in the thoughts of God, before it came to be realized in Creation. Hence all created life necessarily bears in itself a law for its existence, instituted by God Himself. There is no life outside us in Nature, without such divine ordinances, – ordinances which are called the laws of Nature – a term which we are willing to accept, provided we understand thereby, not laws originating from Nature, but laws imposed upon Nature. So, there are ordinances of God for the firmament above, and ordinances for the earth below, by means of which this world is maintained, and, as the Psalmist says, These ordinances are the servants of God. Consequently there are ordinances of God for our bodies, for the blood that courses through our arteries and veins, and for our lungs as the organs of respiration. Similarly there are ordinances of God for logic, to regulate our thoughts; ordinances of God for our imagination, in the domain of aesthetics; and thus also, strict ordinances of God for the whole of human life in the domain of morals.” Kuyper, Stone Lectures).

No doubt, this is not yet a truly philosophical and scientific conception of the law-spheres that govern temporal reality. Nevertheless, in its popular form, it is a religiously rooted guideline for philosophical inquiry that contains a great, profound thought: the unity of the divine law lies above logic, in the central religious relation to God’s sovereignty as Creator. Within temporal reality this central religious unity of the law is refracted into a great multiformity of law-spheres, each of which retains its own nature and within which the logical sphere is merely one among many. There is no warrant, therefore, for reducing the other spheres of ordinances to the logical sphere. Kuyper himself elaborated on this latter thought with great acuity in his Stone Lecture on “Calvinism and Art,” where we find the following remarkable passage:

“Intellectual art is no art, and the effort put forth by Hegel to draw art out from thoughts, militated against the very nature of art. Our intellectual, ethical, religious [ie pistic] and aesthetic life each commands a sphere of its own. These spheres run parallel and do not allow the derivation of one from the other. It is the central emotion, the central impulse, and the central animation, in the mystical root of our being, which seeks to reveal itself in the outer world in these four branches. . . . If, however, it be asked how there can arise a unity of conception embracing these four domains, it constantly appears that in the finite this unity is found only at that point where it springs from the fountain of the Infinite. There is no unity in your thinking save by a well-ordered philosophical system, and there is no system of philosophy which does not ascend to the issues of the Infinite. In the same way there is no unity in your moral existence save by the union of your inner existence with the moral world-order, and there is no moral world-order conceivable but for the impression of an Infinite power that has ordained order in this moral world. Thus also no unity in the revelation of art is conceivable, except by the art-inspiration of an Eternal Beautiful, which flows to us from the fountain of the Infinite and elevates us to the Infinite.” (Kuyper, Stone Lecture on “Calvinism and Art,”)

What is most striking in this quotation from Kuyper is his profound emphasis on the religious unity of God’s law, both in its Origin and in its central fullness of meaning. Kuyper’s understanding of the law here corresponds perfectly to his Scriptural conception of the heart as the religious concentration point of all the temporal functions of human existence. And from this follows, as a matter of course, the idea of sphere-sovereignty, that is, the notion that the law-spheres that Kuyper expressly mentions are mutually irreducible by their very nature.


The metaphysical logos theory, which ultimately reduces all laws to logical relations that originate in the divine Logos, thus has been cut off at its religious root. There also is no room in Kuyper’s view for the theory that there are greater or lesser degrees of reality, depending on proximity to or distance from the ideas. Woltjer, in particular, had elaborated on this Neoplatonic twist in the logos theory at length in his Ideëel en Reëel. Kuyper’s understanding of the law, however, which he unfolded in his Stone Lectures as a direct fruit of the basic Scriptural, religious position of Calvinism, was diametrically opposed to any such theory.


What Kuyper implicitly discovered here is the true point of contact between religion and philosophy, and in this he performed a lasting service for Reformed philosophy. For there can be no doubt that the view of the law that I have set forth briefly above by itself entails a radical transformation of philosophy’s whole outlook upon the structure of reality. 


It is true that Kuyper did not carry this view through consistently in his scientific works. Alongside this purely Scriptural line of thought, he also adhered to traditional scholastic thought patterns. This, however, in no way proves that both viewpoints have an equal right to exist in an intrinsically Reformed philosophy. It only shows that Kuyper lacked the opportunity to carry through his basic Reformed conception in the internal course of scientific inquiry. Kuyper himself, in fact, described this on many occasions as a great shortcoming that held forth a huge task for the next generation.


 (Extracted from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II, Paideia Press, 2013, pp 83-86)


The above book is available HERE

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Logos critique extracts:


1) The theory of the Logos in the critical realism of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer.


2) The origin: Plato, Philo


3) The Logos theory of Plotinus


4) Logos speculation in Christian thought before Council of Nicea (325).


5) Accommodation of Trinity and Creation doctrines post Nicea (325 AD) and Constantinople (381 AD). Augustine, Eriugena



7. Kuyper, Woltjer, and Bavinck logicized God’s order for the creation
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Herman Dooyeweerd: Critique of Logos Theory 6. Hellenistic antipathy towards the Christian philosophy of accommodation.

6. Hellenistic antipathy towards the Christian philosophy of accommodation.

 (Extract from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II)


One must never forget that the logos theory of Greek philosophical theology was basically rooted in the rational principle of form, and that its highest standard for cosmic order was a rational standard. It is well known that Hellenistic philosophy, in taking its stand against the Christian religion, was repelled by this religion precisely because it dethroned the rational form principle. It could not tolerate Christianity’s teaching that the cosmos has to be viewed from the perspective of an infinitely more profound principle, a principle that assigns even to thought a proper, limited place within the created order.


Greek philosophy intuitively perceived the depth of this radical antithesis between itself and the Christian religion. It did not grasp this new Christian principle, but rather regarded it, in contrast to its own rational principle of form, as a barbaric reversion to the darkness of the matter principle. The apostle Paul gave a trenchant description of its attitude when he wrote that the gospel is a stumbling block to the Jews and folly to the Greeks (1 Corinthians 1:23).


It was not without reason that Christian thinkers attempted to accommodate the Greek theories of the logos and the ideas and the Greek view of human nature to the divine Word-revelation. Their primary goal was to win the Greeks over to the Truth of the Christian religion and to counter the accusation that this religion was irrational. Their effort was flawed, however. When Greek philosophy was pressed into the service of Christian doctrine, the way to a deep understanding of the central significance of the Christian religion for philosophical thought was cut off. Plotinus rightly pointed out to the “Christian” Gnostics that they had taken all their real philosophical goods from Greek philosophy, but that they had put this philosophy in barbaric disarray by combining it in a bizarre way with their presumed higher knowledge. They imagined that in doing this they stood far above Plato and the other giants of Greek thought, when in reality they stood far below them in philosophical depth.


This accusation, to be sure, could not be maintained against Christian thinkers such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Nevertheless, authentic Hellenistic philosophy realized intuitively that these great church fathers, for all their erudition and knowledge of Greek thought, were trying to use this thought for a goal to which it could not lend itself. The Hellenists perceived that the church fathers had no right to speak of a “philosophia christiana” so long as they did nothing more than adapt alien philosophical notions to Christian dogma. The judgment of Porphyry, a pupil of Plotinus, concerning Origen is revealing in this regard. Porphyry wrote the following about Origen: 

(Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiae VI,19): “But Origen, having been educated as a Greek in Greek literature, went over to the barbarian recklessness. And carrying over the learning, which he had obtained, he hawked it about, in his life conducting himself as a Christian and contrary to the laws, but in his opinions of material things and of the Deity being like a Greek, and mingling Grecian teachings with foreign fables. For he was continually studying Plato . . . .”) (History of the Church V.19.7-8. Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Series 2, Volume 1, pp. 265-266).

It was because of a false dilemma that the church fathers accepted the philosophical content of the Greek theory of the logos. As Augustine reasoned, following Gregory of Nyssa, if God, through the Logos, did not create the world in accordance with rational ideas, we then would have to conclude that He performed His work of creation in an “irrational” manner (Retractationes I, 3, 2. Written close to his death this work contains Augustine's mature view; cf. vol. 60 in Fathers of the Church, CUA Press, 1999). Augustine already knew from Plotinus’ theology, however, that the contrast between rational and irrational cannot be applied to the Origin of all things, since God’s nature is above reason.


Plotinus did not carry this thought through in his logos theory, simply because for him the logos was not the divine unity itself, but only a product of the first divine radiation. Augustine, by contrast, professed the Scriptural doctrine that the three Persons of the Godhead share the same nature. How, then, could he have accepted a theory of logos and ideas that even Plotinus did not venture to apply to his divine One?


In Augustine’s thought, the theory of the logos patently came into conflict with the Christian Scriptural ground-motive of creation, fall, and redemption. He maintained the absolute sovereignty of God’s creative will, and the logos theory simply was not designed with this Scriptural doctrine of creation in view. To the contrary, it fit hand in glove with the rational form principle of the Platonic realistic theory of ideas. […] In contrast to this Greek view, the Scriptural doctrine of creation underscores the truth that thought is not the origin of the divine creation order, but is rather subject and subordinate to that order. Nowhere in Scripture do we find the predicate “divine” attached to logical, as opposed to pre-logical, matters. God’s order for the creation is only disclosed to human thinking when man begins to bow in faith before God’s majesty, submitting his thought to God’s law instead of trying to logicize that law in accordance with Greek logos theory.


 (Extracted from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II, Paideia Press, 2013, pp 80-83)

                      

The above book is available HERE

——————————————————————————

Logos critique extracts:


1) The theory of the Logos in the critical realism of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer.


2) The origin: Plato, Philo


3) The Logos theory of Plotinus


4) Logos speculation in Christian thought before Council of Nicea (325).


5) Accommodation of Trinity and Creation doctrines post Nicea (325 AD) and Constantinople (381 AD). Augustine, Eriugena



7. Kuyper, Woltjer, and Bavinck logicized God’s order for the creation
——————————————————————————

Herman Dooyeweerd: Critique of Logos Theory 5) Accommodation of Trinity and Creation doctrines post Nicea (325 AD) and Constantinople (381 AD). Augustine, Eriugena.

5) Accommodation of Trinity and Creation doctrines post Nicea (325 AD) and Constantinople (381 AD). Augustine, Eriugena.

 (Extract from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II)


At the Ecumenical Councils of Nicea and Constantinople, the Christian church formulated the doctrine of the divine Trinity as a complete oneness of nature (or being) between the three Persons of the Godhead. Following this, thinkers trod further down the road of accommodation between the logos theory and this trinitarian dogma, which earlier had been worked out in a Scriptural sense by Irenaeus and Athanasius.


Among the Greek church fathers schooled in Origen’s theology, Gregory of Nyssa (335-ca.395 AD) in particular elaborated on the logos theory at length in this new accommodated form. He combined the Jewish conception of the unity of the divine nature with the Neoplatonic conception of the deity’s three hypostases, and he interpreted the ideas in the divine Logos, which he too understood as the second Person of the divine nature, as “thoughts of God.” Eusebius of Caesarea, meanwhile, the famous church historian who was strongly influenced by Platonism, had taken a stand against the Neoplatonic theory of the emanation of the logos from the divine One, a notion that had been erroneously ascribed to Plato.


The theory of the logos first received its definitive, “orthodox” form in the thought of Aurelius Augustinus (354-430 AD), the grand master of the Latin church fathers. Under the influence of Marius Victorinus, who did not convert to Christianity until 355 AD in his old age, and who himself formulated an elaborate logos theory, Augustine made the philosophical-theological speculation of Plotinus, in particular, into an object of accommodation.


He began, however, by upholding the oneness of nature or being of the three Persons of the Godhead against Plotinus’ notion of three divine hypostases whose perfection of being is successively diminished, and by defending the Scriptural doctrine of the incarnation of the Word against the Gnostic theory that Christ’s earthly body was a mere semblance. This latter theory was inseparably tied to the religious dualism between mind or spirit and matter, which both the Gnostics and Origen carried to an extreme. Matter, in the sense of the Greek matter motive, thus was completely deprived of divinity.


Further, Augustine, whose understanding of the ground-motive of the Christian religion was basically pure, forcefully defended creation as an act of God’s sovereign will against the Plotinian theory of radiation. Despite this defense, however, someone like John Scotus Erigena [recte Eriugena = “Irish-born”] (ca. 801-877 AD) clearly reverted to this theory in the ninth century under the influence of Origen. It carried him to dangerous pantheistic consequences, just as did his logos speculation, in which the Logos functioned as the principle by which multiplicity was traced back to the divine unity.


On the other hand, Augustine did adopt the Plotinian theory of degrees of reality, although he restricted it to the created cosmos. He also adopted the Stoic theory of germinal forms (the logos spermatikos) in the material world, albeit in a semi-Plotinian accommodation to the Scriptural motive of creation. Most seriously, he adopted both the theory of the logos as the seat of the divine creative ideas and the whole theory of the objective actualization of these ideas in the material world. All these speculative philosophical doctrines were inseparably tied to the ground-motive of form and matter, whose religious nature was intrinsically pagan. Nevertheless, this was realized neither by Augustine and the scholastics who followed him, nor by Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer, who followed Augustine in their logos theory.


We can grant that the accommodation of these pagan conceptions to the Scriptural doctrines of the Trinity and of creation changed their original meaning to a certain extent. It is equally true, however, that because of this process of accommodation the Christian ground-motive could no longer make itself felt in philosophical and theological thought in an unadulterated way.

78-80


 (Extracted from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II, Paideia Press, 2013, pp 78-80)


The above book is available HERE

——————————————————————————

Logos critique extracts:


1) The theory of the Logos in the critical realism of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer.


2) The origin: Plato, Philo


3) The Logos theory of Plotinus


4) Logos speculation in Christian thought before Council of Nicea (325).


5) Accommodation of Trinity and Creation doctrines post Nicea (325 AD) and Constantinople (381 AD). Augustine, Eriugena



7. Kuyper, Woltjer, and Bavinck logicized God’s order for the creation
——————————————————————————

vendredi 15 septembre 2023

Herman Dooyeweerd: Critique of Logos Theory 4. Logos speculation in Christian thought before Council of Nicea (325).

4. Logos speculation in Christian thought before Council of Nicea (325).

 (Extract from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II)


Christian thought was devastated during its first few centuries by these logos speculations. At first, Philo’s idea of the logos was followed almost literally. Circa A.D. 150 it was the central idea of religious philosophical thought, and the Apologists simply identified it in its Jewish-Hellenistic form with the “Word” (Logos] of the Gospel of John. Thus they regarded the Logos as a being that was actually neither God nor cosmos, but was rather the bridge or mediator between spirit and matter. Tertullian (160-222), a lawyer in Carthage, elaborated on this theology at length in a materialistic, Stoic manner.


According to Berkhof, the main features of the Apologists’ theology can be summarized as follows:

“For the purpose of creation God called into existence a personal being, the Logos, through whom He has made all things. The human person, though a participant in the Logos, was misled by demons and thus ensnared in ignorance, polytheism, and immorality. In order to set humankind right again the Logos himself appeared in human form. Thus Christ unmasked the deception of the demons, proclaimed the true doctrine of God and the world and of the coming judgment, and showed the way to a God-pleasing manner of life. This manner of life is practiced in the church; and there are also ‘seeds of the Logos’ outside of it (especially in Plato), but there people remained trapped in error. The human being has a free will and can, with the help of Christ’s teaching and example, free himself from the grip of the demons. In Christ, therefore, there has appeared a mere demigod, who is not a Redeemer in the Scriptural sense but only an example and teacher.” (Hendrikus Berkhof, De Geschiedenis der Kerk, Nijkerk, 1967, pp. 52 ff)

Thus, the acceptance of the Jewish-Hellenistic logos theory initially led to a radical undermining of the ground-motive of the divine Word-revelation, that of creation, fall into sin, and redemption through Jesus Christ. Under the influence of the dualistic ground-motive of form and matter, the Christian religion was converted into a moral system with a Christian veneer.


Things did not improve in the theological-philosophical systems of Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150-215) and of the great Greek church father Origen (185-254), who only added philosophical depth to the logos theory of the Apologists. According to Clement the world is animated by the Logos as the vehicle of all rational-moral forces, who illuminated the souls from the beginning. The Logos instructed the Jews through Moses and the prophets, and among the Greeks he raised up wise men and offered philosophy as a teacher of righteousness. Only in Jesus Christ, however, was this Logos fully revealed.


Clement’s Logos is the archetype of the created world, the sum total of the ideas, the mediator between God and world (in the sense of Philo) and the rational law of the cosmos. Within the divine triad, the Holy Spirit occupies the third position after the Father and the Logos.


Clement then connected this Logos doctrine with a ranking, borrowed from pseudo-Christian Gnosticism, between pistis (faith) and gnōsis (knowledge). The faith of the simple was contrasted with the Christian knowledge of the Gnostic, which ranks much higher and is able to penetrate to the hidden meaning of the Word-revelation through allegorical interpretation of Scripture. Philosophy is indispensable for arriving at this gnōsis. Pistis too is a necessary condition for Christian gnōsis, but it is only through gnōsis that one can freely and fully surrender himself to God.


Only the works of the Christian Gnostic are perfectly good, because they correspond to the Logos, the divine reason. This ideal of the wise Christian person came dangerously close to that of the Stoic sage, for it was carried all the way to the demand of apatheia, of freeing oneself of all feelings and emotions. Clement in fact wrote a book called The Pedagogue, in which his exposition of the rules for Christian living often literally followed the discourses of the cynically inclined Stoic Musonius Rufus. An obvious connection became manifest here between the logos theory and the Greek religious idea of theoria, which I will discuss later. The Gnostic, who shares in the Logos, already on earth becomes a “God walking in the flesh.” (Stromateis VII, 16; Stählin edition 3, 71). He raises himself above the temporal world and, in the eternal theoria he beholds and grasps God – not just in isolated ecstatic moments, as Philo and later the Neoplatonists taught, but in lasting communion.


Origen was the first to incorporate the Jewish-Hellenistic logos theory, in combination with Neoplatonic elements, in a systematic exposition of Christian doctrine, which in his hands was turned into a theological-philosophical system of grand dimensions. Like Clement, he regarded Christian doctrine merely as the perfection and completion of what the Logos had already disclosed in Greek philosophy. Origen thus saw pagan wisdom as a preparation for Christianity, even though his judgment of it still remained rather reserved.


In complete conformity with the philosophical theology of both Philo and the later Neoplatonists, Origen taught that God, in the truest sense of the word, is the absolute unity, exalted above both nous (the thinking mind) and being (Contra Celsum VII, 38). This God in the highest sense of the word is the Father, the origin and goal of all created things. The Son or Logos has been generated from eternity from God the Father as an emanation of the divine light. The Son does have a commonness of being with the Father, but this homoousion is merely relative in nature and implies nothing more than Plotinus’ commonness of being between the divine unity and the nous.


Origen’s Logos is an archetype that proceeds from the Father, but it is of lesser divinity. It is a second God (deúteros theós) of lower rank, who has the same relationship to the Father that the Christian has to him. In relation to the cosmos this Logos is the original type, the image of the invisible God (Contra Celsum VI, 64. Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 4, p. 603). By him all things are created, and they are made in his image alone, not in the image of the Father. As the first-born of the Father the Logos is the principle of all rationality. Seen from the point of view of the creation he is God, but seen from God’s point of view he is a creature (Contra Celsum III, 34. Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 4, p. 478; “Intermediate between the nature of the uncreated and all created things.”). 


As the divine unity unfolds into a multiplicity, the Logos is the first member and the Holy Spirit is the second. This Spirit is even less divine than the logos, and it stands the closest to the created cosmos.


The Holy Spirit thus begins the series of lower spiritual beings, which along with their divine nature also have a free will of their own. Already at this point human souls, as spiritual beings, have the freedom to choose between good and evil. Those who have not chosen the good, God has cast away in punishment for their guilt and encased them in material bodies.


At the end of all things, however, all creatures will be brought back into unity with God (cf. Origen’s main systematic theological work De principiis III, 6, 1 ff). Then will come the destruction of sin, which for Origen, as for the later Neoplatonists, was merely a privation of being; but then also the material bodies will revert to non-being. [Origen believed in a future resurrection of a spiritual body, which resembles “the splendour of the celestial bodies” but, nevertheless, is a body, not mere spirit (De principiis II, 2, 2)].


Origen’s logos theory, too, led to a radical undermining of the ground-motive of the Christian religion. The creation was understood in Neoplatonic fashion as an emanation of the divine light. The radical meaning of the fall into sin was denied. The Logos, in its manifestation in Christ Jesus, is not the Redeemer in the true sense but only a moral example. Finally, the Scriptural doctrine of the divine Trinity was undermined by the Hellenistic speculation about the Father as the absolute One.


 (Extracted from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II, Paideia Press, 2013, pp 74-78)


The above book is available HERE

——————————————————————————

Logos critique extracts:


1) The theory of the Logos in the critical realism of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer.


2) The origin: Plato, Philo


3) The Logos theory of Plotinus


4) Logos speculation in Christian thought before Council of Nicea (325).


5) Accommodation of Trinity and Creation doctrines post Nicea (325 AD) and Constantinople (381 AD). Augustine, Eriugena



7. Kuyper, Woltjer, and Bavinck logicized God’s order for the creation
——————————————————————————

jeudi 14 septembre 2023

Herman Dooyeweerd: Critique of Logos Theory 3) Plotinus.

3. The logos theory of Plotinus.

 (Extract from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II)


Philo’s logos theory exerted tremendous influence on the Apologists and on the church fathers Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Besides this, the logos theory of Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonic philosophy, became extremely important for Christian philosophical thought based on the accommodation standpoint. The reason was that Augustine derived his philosophical conception of the creation order from it.


Plotinus of Alexandria (ca. A.D. 205-270) was a student of Ammonius Saccas, a son of Christian parents who later reverted to pagan Greek religion and tried to achieve a philosophical synthesis between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. He developed a logos theory which arose from the same kind of speculative philosophical reflections as that of Philo, but which nevertheless differed from the latter fundamentally. [Plotinus pursues the line of the step-wise descent from the One, in connection with the view that every emanation represents a weaker image of the preceding level of being.]


Plotinus agreed with Philo in his notion that the deity is absolutely transcendent to the principle of matter. For him as well, the deity is totally exalted above the active nous or reason, since the latter always contains a duality between thought and the object of thought. God is not irrational but supra-rational, just as He has no formed being, but a supra- (supreme) being that is the origin of every form of being.


Aristotle’s idea of God held that He is the absolute, actualized, perfect Reason, whose thinking has only itself as its object (the noēsis noēseōs, “thought thinking itself”). In Plotinus’ view, however, this idea still did not do justice to God’s transcendence. Like Philo, he assumed that human thought concepts can only be applied to the deity in a negative sense; they can only indicate what God is not. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas and their followers were to follow him in this, although in working out his theory of the analogy of being, which I will discuss later, Thomas still also granted a positive significance to the metaphysical determination of God’s attributes.


For Plotinus, the only positive determinations of God’s nature are His unity and His goodness. God is exalted above all being, thinking, and doing. All forms of being (ideas) spring from the fullness of His being, but God Himself is not confined within a particular form of being. Plotinus then attempted, unsuccessfully however, to derive even the principle of matter from the absolute divine unity as Origin. Thus he tried to surmount the polar dualism in the Greek religious ground-motive, an effort that Philo had not made. To accomplish this, Plotinus devised his theory of emanation or procession.


Plotinus asked himself, how did multiplicity spring from the divine unity? This could not have happened through an act of creation or a decree willed by God, for God, according to Plotinus, is exalted above all doing and all activity. He is absolutely unmoved and remains in eternal, silent rest. It also could not have happened through emanation, as pantheism maintains, since by emanation the divine being would be diminished. Only through “radiation”(uitstraling) could all things issue from God’s fullness of being, while He Himself remains eternally the same, just as the sun produces the brilliance that surrounds it without itself losing any of its light. And this radiation takes place not through an act of God’s will, but through a necessity of His being.


The fullness of God’s being must radiate outward, merely because of His goodness. According to Plotinus this radiation occurs in three stages, each earlier stage calling into being the next one.That which originates from God diminishes in perfection of being in each of the three stages. Thus there are degrees of reality, determined by their greater or lesser distance from God and from the world of ideas. Plotinus maintains the dualism of the form-matter motive in his system by drawing, in Platonic fashion, a sharp distinction between the supra-sensible realm, which is entirely ruled by the form principle, and sensible reality, in which the form and matter principles are bound together.


The supra-sensible realm is altogether divine in character. Radiating from the divine One, which is the first and absolute hypostasis, are two lower divine hypostases. The first of these is the divine mind or Logos, which is “the greatest in perfection of being subsequent to the Supreme Perfection.” This Logos is the first reflection or mirror image of the divine unity. Its nature is to contemplate the divine unity. In the intellect or logos there is thus already a fundamental duality of subject and object, of the activity of thinking and that which is thought.


In the Logos are contained the divine ideas, the ideal ontic forms (forms of being) of everything that is actualized in the sensory world. Plotinus conceived of these ideas as substances and as active mental forces, which secure the operation of the logos or nous upon the levels of reality below it. They are inseparably tied to the logos, since their being is identical with their being thought; yet, they are not purely subjective divine thoughts as the middle Platonic school taught, but have a real existence. Furthermore, the ideas are not mere universal forms (universalia) – for instance, forms of the animal, the human being, the plant – but contain in themselves a fullness of individuality. Thus there is an idea of the individual man Socrates, of the man Plato, etc. They also have in them a synthesis between form and matter, since how else could sensible things be images of them? (Enn. II, 4, 4). This “matter,” however, is ideal in nature.


The third hypostasis, finally, is the soul, which is the reflection of the divine intellect or logos. It is the direct fruit of the intellect, and it receives its form from the world of ideas emanating from the logos or nous. It hovers about the divine intellect as its inseparable reflection, its light, its image inseparably attached to it; on the upper level united with it, filled from it, enjoying it, participant in its nature, intellective with it, but on the lower level in contact with the realm beneath itself, or, rather, generating in turn an offspring which must lie beneath (Eneads V,1.7).


The soul, therefore, is the lowest level in the divine, supra-sensible realm; and simultaneously it is the bridge to the sensible realm, which it in turn creates. Plotinus thus gives it an intermediary role, and he accordingly splits it into a higher, simple and rational part called the nous, and a lower part called the phusis, which is turned toward the sensible matter of the body. This lower part of the soul is divisible insofar as the material body cannot incorporate the psychical forces undivided. Nevertheless, the soul as a whole remains an indivisible substance.


There is a real multiplicity of substantial souls. The highest among them is the divine world-soul, which gives form to the entire sensible cosmos and pervades and animates it. The individual souls, however, are not parts of this world soul, but independent radiations from the mental ideas in the logos. All functions of the soul, including memory, sense perception, and even the vegetative function that forms the material body, are supra-sensible and rational in nature. They belong to the substance of the soul, are in fact identical with this substance, and are independent of and separable from the body.


The divine realm extends from the One through the soul. The world-soul contains the logoi, which correspond to the ideas of the logos and are the agents by which the intrinsically indeterminate matter is formed into the things of the sense world. Plotinus borrowed this latter notion from Stoic philosophy and its theory of the logoi spermatikoi, “germinal forms,” which supposedly exert a formative influence upon indeterminate matter from within the world soul. As we shall see later, however, he transformed this Stoic idea in a fundamental way.


Finally, matter itself is the product of the soul through radiation.The soul is a light that at the furthest limit of its radiation turns into its opposite, darkness (Enn. IV, 3.9), and this darkness is unformed matter. In this sense Plotinus calls matter the “depth” (bathos) or“abyss” of every sensible thing.


Whereas the logos is light, matter is darkness. It is non-being (mē on) and an absolute privation of ontic form. As the absence of form it is the principle of evil, but as receptivity for form it is simultaneously an intermediate state between good and evil.


One can plainly see that the polar dualism of the Greek theme of form and matter has reasserted itself in Plotinus’ whole view of reality. He merely camouflaged it by means of his theory of radiation or procession, but it easily broke through this disguise in the polar opposition between light and darkness.


 (Extracted from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II, Paideia Press, 2013, pp 70-74)


The above book is available HERE

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Logos critique extracts:


1) The theory of the Logos in the critical realism of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer.


2) The origin: Plato, Philo


3) The Logos theory of Plotinus


4) Logos speculation in Christian thought before Council of Nicea (325).


5) Accommodation of Trinity and Creation doctrines post Nicea (325 AD) and Constantinople (381 AD). Augustine, Eriugena



7. Kuyper, Woltjer, and Bavinck logicized God’s order for the creation
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Herman Dooyeweerd: Critique of Logos Theory 2) The origin: Plato, Philo.

2. The origin of the Logos theory: Plato, Philo. 

 (Extract from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II)


Let the theory be examined! Quite early, a tendency became manifest to emphasize to the utmost the transcendence of the deity above the principle of matter. Plutarch and Albinus had already done this in the so-called middle Platonic school, and so, under strong Platonic influence, did the Jewish Alexandrian philosopher Philo. Numenius of Apamea, who was in turn influenced by Philo and also by neo-Pythagorean philosophy, did the same. To maintain this transcendence, any direct action of the highest deity upon the cosmos, bound as [the latter was deemed to be] to the matter principle, had to be denied; and intermediate beings were needed in order to ensure divine influence on the material world. This had already happened to some extent in Plato’s Timaeus, where the demiurge, after “creating” the imperishable celestial deities and the immortal part of the human soul, leaves the formation of mortal beings, subject to the power of the matter principle, to these celestial deities (particularly the sun).


The Jewish thinker Philo (born ca. 25 BC), in attempting to strike a synthesis between Old Testament Jewish doctrine and Platonic and Stoic philosophy, devised a logos theory that became more or less the prototype for the later development of this theory in Christian theological and philosophical thought. Philo lived in Alexandria, where Hellenic culture and Greek philosophy blossomed a second time and underwent a synthesis with Eastern religions. He tried to gain a speculative, philosophical understanding of God’s absolute transcendence, as this is taught in the Old Testament (where it is inseparably connected, however, to His immanence in the creation), from within the framework of the Greek religious form-matter motive.


Thus Philo had to deny any direct contact between the deity and “impure matter.” Even the Platonic forms or ideas were still related to the matter principle, since the being of material things, the human person included, was based, according to Plato, on their participation (methexis) in the ideas. What is more, the world of ideas and its thinking correlate, the nous or the logos, still contain a plurality, whereas the deity has to be conceived as an absolute unity, elevated above all plurality. In Philo’s view, therefore, God is elevated even above reason and the ideas. He is the absolute unity, utterly simple in nature and sufficient unto Himself, who is omnipresent in His divine power but not in His being.


For the creation of the world God [in Philo’s view] employed incorporeal forces or ideas, since He Himself could not touch “impure matter.” Philo thus imagined the Platonic ideas as animate, active beings, a notion that Plato himself had already embraced in his dialogue The Sophist (359 BC), written during the period of crisis in his theory of ideas. These ideal forces supposedly surround God as ministering spirits, like the courtiers of a monarch. Among them two basic forces are predominant: the creative force and the ruling force. Philo called the first of these the divine goodness, again following Plato, since Plato had designated the idea of the Good as the final purpose and cause in the entire formation of the world. To these two main forces Philo added many others as the “law-givers.” He regarded them all not merely as divine attributes but as relatively independent spirits, which can appear to men and even have personal relationships with certain people, such as Abraham.


This entire active world of ideas is seated in the divine Logos,which, just like the human logos, operates in two inseparable ways: as thinking reason and as word. The Logos is the mediator between God and the creation, and God uses it to create the world. Philo’s acceptance of the Greek motive of form and matter forced him to abandon the Scriptural doctrine of creation. His Logos finds itself confronted with an eternal matter, and from this it forms creatures “in the image of the eternal ideas,” as Plato had taught. Philo believed that this theory of ideas was present already in Moses, who taught in the book of Genesis (1:27) that God created humankind in His own image. According to Philo, what there is said of humankind has to be applied to the whole visible world.


In his exposition of the Logos and of the ideas in general, Philo vacillates between a purely attributive view, which regards them merely as attributes of the deity, and a substantial view in which they also function as independent beings. One can safely say, however, that the second view, in which the Logos is hypostatized as a Person, predominates in his thought. For the most part, at least, Philo places the Logos next to God the Father as a second divine Person, and it therefore cannot be reduced to a mere attribute or function of the first Person. When he speaks explicitly of the second Person he makes him clearly subordinate to the first, just as happened later in the Monarchian movement in Christian dogmatics. An incarnation of the Logos was out of the question for him, however, merely because of his notion that matter is impure. For this same reason he could not identify his Logos with the hoped-for Messiah.


 (Extracted from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II, Paideia Press, 2013, pp 68-70)


The above book is available HERE

——————————————————————————

Logos critique extracts:


1) The theory of the Logos in the critical realism of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer.


2) The origin: Plato, Philo


3) The Logos theory of Plotinus


4) Logos speculation in Christian thought before Council of Nicea (325).


5) Accommodation of Trinity and Creation doctrines post Nicea (325 AD) and Constantinople (381 AD). Augustine, Eriugena



7. Kuyper, Woltjer, and Bavinck logicized God’s order for the creation
——————————————————————————