Dooyeweerd: Key of Knowledge - Question of Life and Death

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Key of knowledge - 

Question of life and death

by Herman Dooyeweerd

      Thus the central theme of the Holy Scriptures, namely, that of creation, fall into sin, and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit, has a radical unity of meaning, which is related to the central unity of our human existence. It effects the true knowledge of God and ourselves, if our heart is fully opened by the Holy Spirit so that it finds itself in the grip of God's Word and has become the captive of Jesus Christ. So long as this central meaning of the Word-revelation is at issue, we are beyond the scientific problems both of theology and philosophy. Its acceptance or rejection is a matter of life or death to us, and not a question of theoretical reflection. In this sense, the central motive of Holy Scripture is the common supra-scientific starting-point of a truly biblical theology and of a truly Christian philosophy. It is the key of knowledge of which Jesus spoke in his discussion with the Scribes and lawyers. It is the religious presupposition of any theoretical thought, which may rightly claim a biblical foundation. But, as such, it can never become the theoretical object of theology - no more than God and the human I can become such an object.

...I am sorry if my explanation concerning the scientific field of research of dogmatic theology seem not clear at first sight. The difficulties and questions to which it gives rise do not concern the divine Word-revelation, but exclusively the scientific character and bounds of a theological dogmatics and exegesis. And it is necessary 'ad humanam salutem' ['for human salvation'] to go into these difficulties in a serious way. For dogmatic theology is a very dangerous science. Its elevation to a necessary mediator between God's Word and the believer amounts to idolatry and testifies to a fundamental misconception concerning its real character and position. If our salvation be dependent on theological dogmatics and exegesis, we are lost. For both of them are a human work, liable to all kinds of error, disagreement in opinion, and heresy. We can even say that all heresies are of a theological origin. Therefore, the traditional confusion between God's Word as the central principle of knowledge and the scientific object of theological dogmatics and exegesis must be wrong in its fundamentals. For it is this very confusion which has given rise to the false identification of dogmatic theology with the doctrine of Holy Scripture, and to the false conception of theology as the necessary mediator between God's Word and the believers.

...Let us first consider how the Word of God presents itself to us in its full and actual reality. The divine Word-revelation has entered our temporal horizon. The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. This was the 'skandalon' which was equally raised by the incarnation of the Word-revelation in the Holy Scriptures, a collection of books written by different men in the course of ages, be it through divine inspiration, yet related to all the modal aspects of our temporal horizon of experience. It is, however, only under the modal aspect of faith that we can experience that this Word-revelation in the Scriptures has been inspired by the Holy Spirit. And the actual belief through which we know with an ultimate certainty that it is so, cannot be realized in the heart, that religious center of our consciousness, except by the operation of the Word itself, as a spiritual power. What makes the diversity of books of the Old and New Testament into a radical spiritual unity? Their principle of unity can only be the central theme of creation, fall into sin, and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit, since it is the key to true knowledge of God and self-knowledge. We have established that, in its central spiritual sense, as divine motive power addressing itself to our heart, this theme cannot become the theoretical object of theological thought, since it is the very starting point of the latter, insofar as theology is really biblical.

From the foregoing it may appear that there must be a difference in principle between creation, fall and redemption in their central sense as the key to knowledge, and in their sense as articles of faith which may be made into the object of theological thought. Insofar as Reformed theology, too, was influenced by the scholastic basic motive of nature and grace, it also developed dogmatic views which must be considered unbiblical. The Jewish Scribes and lawyers had a perfect theological knowledge of the books of the Old Testament. They wished, doubtless, to hold to the creation, the fall, and the promise of the coming Messiah as articles of the orthodox Jewish faith which are also articles of the Christian faith. Nevertheless, Jesus said to them: "Woe unto you, for ye have taken away the key of knowledge!" (Luke 11:52).

This key of knowledge in its radical and integral sense cannot be made into a theoretical problem. The theologian can only direct his theological thought to it with respect to its necessary supra-theoretical presupposition, if he is really in the grip of it and can bear witness to its radical meaning which transcends all theological concepts. But when he does so, he is not in any different position than the Christian philosopher who accounts for his biblical starting-point, or the ordinary believer who testifies to the radical sense of God's Word as the central motive power of his life in Jesus Christ. In other words, the true knowledge of God in Jesus Christ and true self-knowledge are neither of a dogmatic-theological, nor of a philosophical nature, but have an absolutely central religious [ie directed to ultimate Origin of selfhood] significance. This knowledge is a question of spiritual life or death. Even orthodox theological dogmatics, however splendidly elaborated, cannot guarantee this central spiritual knowledge.” 

(Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought, from pp 86,87, 100)

The above book is available HERE

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Dooyeweerd: How is philosophical thought possible as theoretical thought?

Dooyeweerd:

How is philosophical thought 

possible as theoretical thought? 

(Extract from 

REFORMATION AND SCHOLASTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY VOL II, pp 94-96)

How is philosophical thought possible as theoretical thought? The Philosophy of the Law-Idea opens its transcendental critique with this question, which is directed toward every possible philosophy. The question therefore is not restricted to a Reformed philosophy. Rather, it first of all confronts traditional and modern philosophy with a fundamental problem, since this philosophy starts from the assumption that theoretical thought is autonomous in relation to faith. This problem is transcendental in nature, for it has to do with the boundaries of philosophy. It is concerned with the pre-existing structure of theoretical, philosophical thought, which makes this thought possible to begin with.

This pre-existing structure cannot itself be philosophical in character. Rather, it is a law-governed framework that lies at the foundation of all the activity of philosophical thought; for if philosophical thought departs from this framework, it will lose its philosophic character. And, as I have already observed, the a priori or pre-existing nature of this structure lends it universal validity; that is, it is binding for philosophical thought regardless of the subjective starting point of the thinker.

Nevertheless, this universally valid structural law of theoretical, philosophical thought can only be examined in the theoretical, philosophical attitude of thought. One might begin by believing that such a structure exists, but that would not yet disclose its actual character to our scientific insight. And that is precisely what is needed. For if there is to be any discussion on the question of whether philosophical thought can indeed function independently of a faith commitment, one must first render a scientific account of the nature of this thought.

Hence, if philosophy wishes to proceed in a truly critical manner, it must begin by directing its inquiry toward its own presuppositions. The dogma that theoretical reason is autonomous may in no way be taken as a self-evident consequence of the structure of philosophic thought. That would amount to a dogmatic elimination of the basic critical problem that I formulated at the beginning of this section. Nor may we demand, however, that the proponents of this dogma begin by abandoning it; that, too, would be tantamount to a circumvention of the transcendental basic problem of philosophy by means of a dogmatic statement. One then would simply be countering the dogma that theoretical reason is autonomous with the dogma that it is determined from a supra-theoretical standpoint by presuppositions of faith. And in that case, our critical insight into the nature and structure of philosophical thought would not be enriched in the least. We would merely end up with a confrontation of dogmatic points of view.

At the start of our critical inquiry we may not demand of any thinker that he abandon any dogmatic conviction. There is only one strict condition that must be laid down for a truly critical attitude of thought: the thinker must be prepared to put aside the dogmatic prejudice that regards the postulate of philosophy’s autonomy as purely theoretical and scientific in character. For this prejudice alone bars the way to a critical investigation of the basic problem I have formulated. It simply passes off as a scientific, theoretical judgment what is nothing but a dogma, an unreasoned conviction of faith.

The Philosophy of the Law-Idea makes no claim whatsoever that its transcendental critique of philosophical thought could be undertaken independently of a dogmatic conviction of faith. If it did, after all, it would itself have to begin by accepting the autonomy of theoretical reason as a purely theoretical presupposition, which would be held up as a criterion for deciding whether further inquiry is scientific or not. On the contrary, this philosophy openly avows that it launches its transcendental theoretical critique from the Christian religious standpoint. It remains critical in doing this, however, since from the outset it distinguishes sharply between its faith conviction and all judgments that are intrinsically scientific.

In other words, the Philosophy of the Law-Idea does not mask its starting point. It begins rather by making a sharp, critical distinction between theoretical judgment and supra-theoretical prejudgment. Because of this, no one can become the victim of an artfully disguised trap as he follows our inquiry into the transcendental basic problems of philosophy. One can be confident that no judgment of faith will here be held up as an intrinsically scientific thesis. Indeed, the precise purpose of our transcendental critique is to compel thinkers to render their own account of the true nature of the prejudgments from which they set out.

(Extracted from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II, Paideia Press, 2013, pp 94-96)

The above book is available HERE

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