How is philosophical thought possible as theoretical thought? The Philosophy of the Law-Idea opens its transcendental critique with this question, which is directed toward every possible philosophy. The question therefore is not restricted to a Reformed philosophy. Rather, it first of all confronts traditional and modern philosophy with a fundamental problem, since this philosophy starts from the assumption that theoretical thought is autonomous in relation to faith. This problem is transcendental in nature, for it has to do with the boundaries of philosophy. It is concerned with the pre-existing structure of theoretical, philosophical thought, which makes this thought possible to begin with.
This pre-existing structure cannot itself be philosophical in character. Rather, it is a law-governed framework that lies at the foundation of all the activity of philosophical thought; for if philosophical thought departs from this framework, it will lose its philosophic character. And, as I have already observed, the a priori or pre-existing nature of this structure lends it universal validity; that is, it is binding for philosophical thought regardless of the subjective starting point of the thinker.
Nevertheless, this universally valid structural law of theoretical, philosophical thought can only be examined in the theoretical, philosophical attitude of thought. One might begin by believing that such a structure exists, but that would not yet disclose its actual character to our scientific insight. And that is precisely what is needed. For if there is to be any discussion on the question of whether philosophical thought can indeed function independently of a faith commitment, one must first render a scientific account of the nature of this thought.
Hence, if philosophy wishes to proceed in a truly critical manner, it must begin by directing its inquiry toward its own presuppositions. The dogma that theoretical reason is autonomous may in no way be taken as a self-evident consequence of the structure of philosophic thought. That would amount to a dogmatic elimination of the basic critical problem that I formulated at the beginning of this section. Nor may we demand, however, that the proponents of this dogma begin by abandoning it; that, too, would be tantamount to a circumvention of the transcendental basic problem of philosophy by means of a dogmatic statement. One then would simply be countering the dogma that theoretical reason is autonomous with the dogma that it is determined from a supra-theoretical standpoint by presuppositions of faith. And in that case, our critical insight into the nature and structure of philosophical thought would not be enriched in the least. We would merely end up with a confrontation of dogmatic points of view.
At the start of our critical inquiry we may not demand of any thinker that he abandon any dogmatic conviction. There is only one strict condition that must be laid down for a truly critical attitude of thought: the thinker must be prepared to put aside the dogmatic prejudice that regards the postulate of philosophy’s autonomy as purely theoretical and scientific in character. For this prejudice alone bars the way to a critical investigation of the basic problem I have formulated. It simply passes off as a scientific, theoretical judgment what is nothing but a dogma, an unreasoned conviction of faith.
The Philosophy of the Law-Idea makes no claim whatsoever that its transcendental critique of philosophical thought could be undertaken independently of a dogmatic conviction of faith. If it did, after all, it would itself have to begin by accepting the autonomy of theoretical reason as a purely theoretical presupposition, which would be held up as a criterion for deciding whether further inquiry is scientific or not. On the contrary, this philosophy openly avows that it launches its transcendental theoretical critique from the Christian religious standpoint. It remains critical in doing this, however, since from the outset it distinguishes sharply between its faith conviction and all judgments that are intrinsically scientific.
In other words, the Philosophy of the Law-Idea does not mask its starting point. It begins rather by making a sharp, critical distinction between theoretical judgment and supra-theoretical prejudgment. Because of this, no one can become the victim of an artfully disguised trap as he follows our inquiry into the transcendental basic problems of philosophy. One can be confident that no judgment of faith will here be held up as an intrinsically scientific thesis. Indeed, the precise purpose of our transcendental critique is to compel thinkers to render their own account of the true nature of the prejudgments from which they set out.
(Extracted from Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Vol II, Paideia Press, 2013, pp 94-96)
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